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FIRST NATURE, SECOND NATURE, AND METROPOLITAN LOCATION
ABSTRACT
This paper develops models of spatial equilibrium in which a
central metropolis emerges to supply manufactured goods to an
agricultural hinterland. The location of the metropolis is not
fully determined by the location of resources: as long as it is
not too far from the geographical center of the region, the
concentration of economic mass at the metropolis makes it the
optimal location for manufacturing firms, and is thus self-
justifying. The approach in this paper therefore helps explain








NBERIn his justly acclaimed recent book Nature's Metropolis:
Chicago and the Great West, the historian William Cronon documents
the extraordinary 19th century rise of Chicago as the central city
of the kmerican heartland. As Cronon points out, what made this
rise particularly remarkable was the absence of any distinctive
natural advantages of Chicago's site. The city stood on a flat
plain; the river that ran through the city was barely navigable;
the city's lakeside harbor was inadequate and tended to silt up.
Whatever natural advantages the site did have proved transitory.
Initially Chicago seemed the natural terminus of a canal linking
the watershed of the Mississippi with the Great Lakes, but when a
canal was finally built it had only a few years of economic
importance before being overshadowed by the railroads. Chicago's
harbor on the Great Lakes was not unique, and in any case lake
transportation became relatively unimportant by the 1870s as
compared with rail links. Yet once Chicago had become established
as a central market, as a focal point for transportation and
commerce, its strength fed on itself. As Cronon puts it, the
advantages that "first nature" failed to provide the city were more
than made up for by the self—reinforcing advantages of "second
nature": the concentration of population and production in Chicago,
and the city's role as a transportation hub, provided the incentive
for still more concentration of production there, and caused all
roads to lead to Chicago.
In Cronon's interpretation, then, the rise of Chicago was a
striking example of what David (1985) has called "path dependence":
historical accident, which led people to expect a central role forChicago, led them into decisions that justified that expectation.
The purpose of this paper is to develop an approach to
modeling urban location that makes sense, albeit in a highly
simplified way, of the kind of history-driven process of
metropolitan growth that Cronon describes. The paper develops
models of spatial equilibrium in which a central "metropolis"
emerges to supply manufactured goods to an agricultural hinterland.
This metropolis could be at the agricultural region's geographical
center. However, it need not be, because the metropolis is part of
its own market (and also supplies part of what its own residents
consume). Because of the feedback from the location of the
metropolis to the geography of demand and supply, there is a range
of potential metropolitan sites. As Cronon would put it, the
"second nature" that the existence of the metropolis creates drags
the optimal location of firms with it.
In addition to being of some realistic interest, particularly
as an aid in thinking about urban history, this approach contains
some interesting echoes of a number of intellectual traditions.
There are aspects of both Hotelling and von Thünen to the model;
there is some common ground as well with the central place theory
of Lásch and Christaller; and the models also provide a rigorous
justification for the commonly used geographical concept of "market
potential".
The paper is in four parts. The first part sets out a basic
modeling approach. The second analyzes spatial equilibrium in a
one—dimensional region, in which rural population is spread along3
a line. The third part analyzes a two—dimensional case, in which
population is distributed across a circular plain. The final
section suggest some directions for extension.
1. A modeling approach
The intuition behind the approach in this paper is simple:
firms that have an incentive to concentrate production at a limited
number of locations prefer, other things equal, to choose locations
with good access to markets; but access to markets will be good
precisely where large number of firms choose to locate. This
positive feedback loop drives the formation of urban centers; it
also implies that the location of such centers is not wholly
determined by the underlying natural geography, but can also be
influenced by history and self—fulfilling expectations.
In order to capture this intuition, a formal model must have
three features. First, there must be some costs of transportation,
so that location matters. Second, there must be some immobile
factors of production, providing some form of "first nature" that
constrains the possible spatial structure of the economy. Finally,
there must be economies of scale in the production of at least some
goods, so that there is an incentive for concentration.
The framework that will be used here is based on the two—
location model in Krugman (1991), which in turn relies heavily on
the monopolistic competition model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). We
envision an economy with two sectors: constant—returns agriculture4
and increasing-returns manufacturing. Agricultural output is
produced by geographically immobile factors, which are spread
across space. Manufactures ——whichcome in many differentiated
varieties ——areproduced by mobile factors, which move to wherever
they can achieve the highest return. Cities emerge when
manufacturing firms clump together to be near the markets they
provide for one another.
Specifically, we begin by assuming that everyone in the
economy shares a utility function into which both the agricultural
good and a manufactures aggregate enter:
U-CC1 (1)
where h is the share of manufactured goods in expenditure.
The manufactures aggregate in turn is a CES function of a




Agricultural goods are produced by a sector—specific factor,
agricultural labor. (Ideally, we would introduce land as an
explicit additional factor of production. For simplicity, however,
we do not; the role that should be played by land is proxied by
making agricultural labor immobile). They are produced under
constant returns; without loss of generality we assume that the
unit labor requirement is one. Manufactured goods are similarly
produced by a specific factor, manufacturing labor. In the5
manufacturing sector, however, there are increasing returns; we
introduce these by assuming that for any variety that is actually
produced, there is a fixed labor input required independent of the
volume of output:
—U + (3)




Aside from the sector-specificity of the two kinds of labor,
this is essentially the Dixit—Stiglitz model. The main innovation
here is to make the model spatial. This is done through two
assumptions. First, agricultural labor will be assuaied to be
distributed across space: in the next section we will assume that
it is evenly spread along a line, in the section following that it
is evenly spread across a disk. Second, we assume that although
agricultural goods can be costlessly transported (an assumption
made purely for analytic convenience), manufactured goods are
costly to transport. Specifically, we follow Samuelson's "iceberg"
assumption, under which goods "melt" in transit, so that
transportation costs are in effect incurred in the same goods that
are shipped. The proportional rate of melting is assumed to be
constant per unit of distance, implying that if a single unit of a
manufactured good is shipped a distance D, the quantity that6
arrives is only e,wherer is the transport cost.
This setup is incomplete unless we specify a particular
spatial structure. We may, however, quickly review several familiar
features of this kind of model, well—known both from the original
Dixit—Stiglitz paper and from the extensive derivative literature
in the field of international trade.
First, we note that given the absence of any transportation
costs for agricultural goods, all agricultural workers will receive
the same nominal (although not real) wage.
Second,we note thatmanufacturingwillhavea
monopolistically competitive market structure, in which the price
of each manufactured good at the factory gate will be a constant
proportional markup on the wage rate, and in which all profits will
be competed away by entry.
Third, we note that a fraction of total expenditure will
fall on manufactured goods (including those that "melt" in
transit) ; since profits are competed away, manufacturing workers
will receive a share joftotal income, agricultural workers l—i.
Finally, we note that the elasticity of substitution between
any two products is a.
The miniinalism of this framework is apparent. Yet it is
sufficient to generate some interesting insights into spatial
equilibrium.7
2. one—dimensional model
We begin by considering a one—dimensional region. We assume
that agricultural workers are distributed evenly along a line of
unit length. What we will show is that if transport costs are not
too high, there is an equilibrium in which all manufacturing is
concentrated at a single point along that line. This "metropolis"
could be at the region's center, but it need not be: in general
there is a range of potential locations, whose width depends in an
economically meaningful way on the model's parameters.
The method we will use is to posit an initial situation in
which all manufacturing workers are concentrated at a single
location, then ask whether a small group of workers will find it
advantageous to move to any other location. If not, then
concentration of manufacturing at that location is indeed an
equilibrium.
Suppose, then, that all manufacturing is concentrated at the
location x along the unit interval. We need to ask whether it to
the advantage of a small group of these workers to relocate to some
other site XA. To do this, we need to calculate the real wage that
the relocated workers could earn at XA relative to that which they
can earn at x.
Letwbe the ratio of the nominal wage rate at XA to that at
X. Given the monopolistically competitive market structure, the
ratio of the f.o.b. price of a good manufactured at XA to that of8
atypical good manufactured at x will also be w. The price ratio
to a consumer at location x will reflect both this f.o.b. price
ratio and transport costs, which depend on the consumers relative
distance from XA and x. Letbe this relative price to a consumer
at location x: given our assumption about transport costs, it is
simply
—we'''C I) (6)
Nextconsider the ratio of sales of a product manufactured at
XA to that of a typical good manufactured at xc. Given the
elasticity of substitution of a, the ratio of consumption by a
consumer at location x is
c—p0 (7)
The ratio of value of sales to the consumer at x, however, is
less sensitive to the price, because volume effects are offset by
valuation effects; thus we have for the value ratio
—p;(O-1) (8)
To calculate the overall ratio of sales of a product at x to
that of a typical product from the metropolis, we note that
manufacturing workers, who account for a fraction of demand, are
all concentrated at xc; while agricultural workers, who account for
the rest, are spread evenly along the unit interval. This implies
that the overall sales ratio is
S- 4we'J'+ (l-i)f1[we']'dx (9)9
or, rearranging,
S — (1_Ii)fl[et1_1dx} (10)
Equation (10) determines relative sales as a function of the
relative wage rate. We can, however, turn it around to determine
the relative wage rate by invoking the zero—profit Condition.
First, note that by assumption all firms at x are earning zero
profits, with their operating surpluses just covering their fixed
costs. A firmatxA must do the same. But the operating surplus of
a firm in the Dixit-Stiglitz model is proportional to its sales,
while the fixed costs are incurred in manufacturing labor, which at
XA receives a relative wage w. It follows, then, that if there are
to be zero profits we must have
S-w (11)
Putting (10) and (11) together, we have our expression for the




To determine whether a concentration of manufactures at x is
an equilibrium, however, we need to compare not the relative
nominal wage but the relative real wage. The difference between the
two comes from the fact that manufactured goods produced at x are
part of workers' consumption basket, with a weight .Takingthis
into account, we note that the relative real wage rate is
— (13)10
Equations (12) and (13) determine the real wage rate that a
small group of workers would roceive if they were to locate at a
sitewhen all other manufacturing workers are concentrated at
One way to think about (13) is that it is a kind of index of
"market potential" of alternative sites. Such indices are widely
used by geographers as a way to help think about plant location. In
the standard calculation of market potential, the potential of a
site is measured by a weighted sum of the purchasing power of all
available markets, with the weights inversely proportional to
distance from that mite. In thia came the weights are derived from
an explicit model of profit maximization, and there is also a
"forward linkage" due to the role of metropolitan products in
consumption. At a broad level, however, the idea is similar ——a
similarity that will become even more evident when we turn to the
two—dimensional model of the next section.
Returning to (13), we immediately note that workers will
choose to locate at the value of xA that maximizes their real wage.
We thus have a simple definition of an equilibrium metropolitan
location. A metropolis at x is an equilibrium if, given that
location, the maximum of (13) is also at x.
Figure 1 illustrates such an equilibrium with the most obvious
came, a metropolis located at x =0.5,at the exact center of the
line. For the purposes of this example we met a =4, r=.5,p =
.2.1We see that the real wage is indeed maximized at =0.5,so
1For the purposes of the calculation the agricultural labor
force, instead of being continuously spread along the line, was
placed at 11 discrete locations (that is, at intervals of 0.1).11
that this is an equilibrium metropolitan location.
It might seem that a metropolis at the center of the region is
always a possible equilibrium. Unfortunately, this is not quite
right, because there may exist no equilibrium with only a single
metropolis. If transportation costs are high enough, then even if
one posits a concentration of all manufacturing at the center,
workers will find it advantageous to move away from the center to
get better access to the rural market. Figure 2 illustrates this
point, by calculating market potential with a hypothetical
metropolis at x=O.5, but with a transport cost of r =1.5.The
central metropolis is not an equilibrium.
Presumably in the case of high transport costs equilibrium
must take the form of several metropolitan centers. The lower are
transport costs, the fewer and larger the metropolises can be. In
this paper, however, I will not try to pursue that line of inquiry.
Instead, we will simply assume that transport costs are
sufficiently low that equilibria with a single urban center do
exist, and restrict ourselves to examining that center's potential
location 2
Let us now return to Figure 1. Notice that in that figure the
market potential line has a "kink" at the metropolitan location.
This kink reflects the concentration of economic mass at the
2One might expect that the ability to sustain a single
metropolis would depend on the geographic extent of the region as
well as one transportation costs. In this model, however, these are
essentially the same thing. The size of the region (the length of
the line) is normalized at unity; lengthening the line and
increasing r have exactly the same effects.12
metropolis. Stepping slightly outside the model, the incentive to
be at this concentration of mass makes the existence of a
metropolis robust to small amounts of "noise", Suppose, for
example, that some workers have a small preference to be a little
left of center, while others have ,a small preference to be to the
right. The kink in market potential at the metropolis implies that
these workers will nonetheless all clump together at the same
place.3
Returning to the model, the kink also implies that the exact
center of the line is not the only possible site for the
metropolis. For suppose that the metropolis lies a little bit to
the left or right of the center. There will then be some incentive
to move away from the metropolis toward the Center. But given the
kink, as long as the metropolis is not too far from the center the
market potential line will still slope down in both directions. In
effect, if we move the metropolis we drag the point of maximum
market potential along with it.
Figure 3 illustrates this point. All parameters are the same
as in Figure 1, but this time we suppose that the metropolis is
located at x =0.4,that is, somewhat left of center. Nonetheless,
as we see from the figure, the point of maximum market potential is
still at Thus this is also an equilibrium metropolitan
3For example, in Cronon's case of Chicago in the 19th century,
the market potential map for wheat marketing would presumably have
looked different from that for the slaughterhouses, which in turn
would have looked different from that for lumber, and different yet
again for different manufacturing industries. Yet the gravitational
attraction of Chicago meant that the location of peak market
potential for all of these sectors was in the same place.13
location.
Not all locations, however, are necessarily suitable for a
metropolis. If the hypothetical metropolis is too far from the
center, it may be advantageous for workers to move away. In Figure
4, again with the same parameters, we hypothesize a metropolis at
x =0.1.In this case, workers can achieve a higher real wage at
sites to the right. Thus 0.1 is jjQanequilibrium metropolitan
location.
It seems apparent that there is a range of potential
metropolitan locations, including the center of the region but also
extending some distance to either side. We can solve analytically
for this range by applying a criterion of local stability: a
necessary condition for a metropolitan site to be an equilibrium if
that given a hypothetical metropolis at that site, the market
potential has a local maximum there. Given the symmetry of the
problem, we need only consider locations to the left of center;
obviously in that case a more desirable alternative site, if it
exists, will lie to the right. So the defining criterion for the
range of potential sites is: if we posit a metropolis at some x <
0.5, then d/dxA for XA slightly greater than x must be negative.
This local stability criterion simplifies the algebra
massively: all the absolute value terms in (12) and (13) become
unambiguously signed, and when the expression is evaluated in the
vicinity of XA =xall of the exponential terms become unity. Thus
letting R be the derivative of the relative real wage with respect
to XAwhen is just slightly greater than xc, we have14
R—-L (o—i)+(1-i) (a—i)(l—2x) (14)
Bearingin mind that for an equilibrium metropolitan location
we must have R<O, we note that (14) contains two negative terms and
one positive. Broadly, the negative and positive effects may be
seen respectively as the "centripetal" forces tending to hold a
metropolis together and the "centrifugal" forces tending to pull it
apart ——or,as Myrdal (1957) put it, "backwash" and "spread"
effects. More specifically, by examining (12) and (13) one can
place direct economic interpretations on the three terms. The first
term in (14) comes from the role of metropolitan goods in
consumption, introduced in (13); it therefore represents, in
Hirschman's (1958) terms, a "forward linkage". The second term
comes from the role of the metropolis as a source of demand for
manufactured goods; it therefore represents a Hirschman—type
"backward linkage". The third term, finally, represents the
incentive to move away from the metropolis to be closer to the
rural market.
The criterion R<O defines the range of potential metropolitan
sites. For a metropolis to the left of center, we have
1 -2x ( (15) l—a-i
p.15
The larger is the right hand side of (15), the wider the range
of potential sites; if the right hand side exceeds 1, any point on
the line can accommodate a metropolis.
The width of the range depends in an economically sensible way
on the parameters. It is increasing in j,theshare of manufactures
in spending: this makes sense, because it is the importance of
manufactures in consumption and of manufacturing workers' income in
demand that gives rise to the forward and backward linkages that
attract production to the metropolis. The range is decreasing in a:
the less monopoly power firms have (and hence also the smaller the
degree of increasing returns in equilibrium), the less powerful the
forces for metropolitan concentration.
For the case of a one—dimensional region, then, we have been
able to show that if transport costs are not too high there will be
an equilibrium in which all manufacturing is concentrated in a
single metropolis; that this equilibrium is not unique, because
there is a range of potential metropolitan sites; and that the
width of this range depends in an economically meaningful way on
the model's parameters.
The tradition of economic geography, however, contains a
strong cartographic component, in which one tries to relate
theoretical concepts to actual maps. And maps, unfortunately, have
two dimensions rather than one. So it is natural to ask whether the
insights gained from this one—dimensional model still apply in a
two—dimensional world. In the next section we show that they do.16
3. A two—dimensional model
The two—dimensional analogue of a line is a disk. We now
imagine, then, a region in which the agricultural labor force is
spread evenly across a disk; we normalize the radius of the disk to
unity, and let the center be x=y=O. All the other assumptions are
the same as in the one—dimensional model.
The analogy with the one-dimensional model immediately
suggests what we are going to find. Provided that transportation
costs are not too high, there will be an equilibrium with all
manufacturing concentrated at a central metropolis. This metropolis
could be in the geometric center of the disk, but it need not be:
because changing the location of the metropolis itself changes the
map of market potential, there will be a range of potential
metropolitan locations. In the one—dimensional case this range was
a central portion of the line segment; in the two—dimensional case
it will be a central disk within the regional disk. Figure 5
illustrates schematically what we will find: the larger disk
represents the region as a whole, the shaded interior disk the set
of potential metropolitan locations.
The analytics of this model are very similar to the one—
dimensional model, but complicated by the need to measure distances
in two dimensions. Letusposit a metropolis at x, y; without loss
of generality (since one can always rotate the disk), assume y=O.
We want to consider the attractiveness of an alternate location
To calculate this, we need to know three distances. Let DAC be17
thedistance between the alternative location and the setropolis;
we have
DAC— /(xA_xc)24y (16)
LetD(x,y)be the distance from the metropolis to some other
location (x,y):
D(x,y) - (17)
And let D(x,y) be the distance from the alternate location to
(x,y):
D(x,y) —l(x_xA)2+(y_yA)2 (18)
By analogy with the one-dimensional case, the sales of a firm
at the alternate location relative to those of one in the
metropolis are
S —[wec]0l+-J-f'fJwe' (D(x.y) -D(x.y 'J°1dydx (19)






And the relativereal wage at the alternate location is
— (21)18
Equations (l6)-(2l) can be used to construct a market
potential map, given the location of a hypothetical metropolis. And
as in the one-dimensional case, if the location of the posited
metropolis is also the point of greatest market potential, then
that is an equilibrium location.
Figure 6 shows the case of a metropolis located at the
geometric center of the region, under the assumptions r 0.5, i=
0.3,a4•4 (Since the diagram is symmetric, only the upper half
of the disk is Shown). The market potential is represented by
contour lines, loci of equal real wages that are .95, .9, and .8 of
the real wage at the metropolis; in this case, of course, the
contour lines are simply circles around the metropolitan center.
Since the central bulls—eye is also the point of peak market
potential, a central metropolis is an equilibrium.
But a somewhat off—center metropolis may also be an
equilibrium. Figure 7 shows the market potential map generated by
a metropolis located at XcO.3. The contour lines are dragged of f
to the east by the metropolis's economic mass; the metropolis is
still the best location, and thus this proposed geography is also
an equilibrium.
As in the one—dimensional model, we can analyze the
determinants of the range of potential metropolitan sites by
examining local stability. Suppose we posit a metropolis at (xe, 0),
with x>0. If there is a better location for a small group of
4As in the one-dimensional case, this example was constructed
using a discrete distribution of rural population at 317 points,
located at grid intervals of 0.1.19
workers,it will be toward the center; thus we need only consider
alternative locations with x< and y=O. For local stability, the
derivative of with respect to x must be positive for XA slightly
less than x. Letting L represent this derivative, we have
L— (20—1) (a—l)f1fiEF(x-xA) ( (x—x)2+y2)1'2dy
dxI
Asin the one—dimensional model, this local derivative is
simpler than the global equation, but unfortunately not quite as
much so. There are two terms inside the brackets. The first term
captures the forward and backward linkage effects, and is always
positive. The second term is always negative: one can see this by
thinking of the term as representing the weighted sum of a series
of values of x—xA. Now compare the weight on each positive value x—
xwiththat on —(x—xA); in each case the weight on the negative
value is larger. So the second term in (23) captures the
centrifugal forces pulling the metropolis apart.
The further the metropolis is from the geometric center of the
disk, the stronger are these centrifugal forces. Differentiating
with respect to XA=Xc,wefind
-_-L-a-i(01)f'f (xxc;2+y2']' 0(23)20
Thus there may, as suggested in Figure 5, be a maximum
distance of the metropolis from the center.
This maximum distance, and thus the area of potential
metropolitan sites, depends on and a. In particular, it is
straightforward to show that dL/d>O, which implies that the radius
of the range of potential metropolitan sites is increasing in j.
Thatis, the larger the share of income spent on manufactures, and
hence the stronger the positive feedback of actual to optimal
manufacturing location, the less 'first nature" determines where
manufacturing takes place.
4. Limitations of the analysis
The models developed in this paper offer a kind of
"gravitational" analysis of the existence of metropolitan centers.
Figure 7 in particular suggests the following metaphor: the
concentration of economic mass at the metropolis bends economic
space around itself, and it is precisely this curvature of the
econoxnic space that sustains the metropolitan concentration.
I would argue that this approach, in spite of the numerous
special assumptions needed to yield tractable models, conveys an
essentially correct view of metropolitan location. Nonetheless, the
models presented here have four serious limitations.
First, the assumption that transportation of agricultural
goods is costless is justified only by the (very Considerable)
analytical simplification it makes possible. For any realistic21
application of this approach to actual urban history it must be
abandoned.
Second, and related, the assumption of an exogenously
distributed agricultural work force is ultimately unsatisfactory.
In particular, it prevents the models from accommodating von
Thünen's key insight about the relationship between distance from
the metropolis, land rents, and land use.
Third, the models assume that transportation cost is strictly
proportional to distance. Yet in practice ——andabove all in the
Cronon's story of Chicago, which motivated this paper ——increasing
returns to transportation, which lead to the formation of
transportation hubs, play a key role in metropolitan concentration.
A preliminary effort to model this is in Kruginan (1990), but no
effort is made to incorporate this analysis here.
Finally, throughout this paper the focus has been on the
location of a single metropolis. A realistic analysis will have to
take into account the emergence of a system of cities. At present
there are two different approaches to modelling urban systems.
Central place theory, deriving from Lösch (1940) and Christaller
(1933) and widely used by geographers, is a powerful metaphor but
lacks satisfactory rnicrofoundations. Meanwhile, urban economists —-
notablyHenderson (1974, 1988) ——havedeveloped models of urban
systems that carefully model behavior, but which lack any spatial
content. The approach in this paper is among other things an effort
to build a bridge between these traditions, but it does not manage
to get beyond the one—city case.22
These are, then, only preliminary models. They do, however,
offer a new approach that may eventually prove able to accommodate
greater realism.
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